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The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a key element of the
United States' strategic sealift capability. The Maritime
Administration (MARAD) maintains RRF vessels in five-, ten-
and 20-day readiness status to provide responsive shipping in
support of military operations worldwide in time of conflict.
This thesis investigates the initial nine RRF vessels
activated by MARAD Western Region in support of Operation
Desert Shield. Problems encountered in the areas of condition
at the time of breakout, engineering, crew, workforce
resources available for breakout, parts and stores, and
bunkering are discussed for each vessel. In addition, several
prior activations of RRF vessels are discussed and then
compared to the activations for Operation Desert Shield.
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The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the
activation of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels in support of
Operation Desert Shield. It will analyze the problems
encountered during the activation process and attempt to




The RRF was established in November of 1976, as a subset
of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , to maintain
certain vessels in the NDRF in a higher state of readiness to
provide the nation with strategic sealift capability. The RRF
is maintained by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) in three
regions, the East Coast, West Coast, and Gulf Coast. As of
January 10, 1991, 65 RRF ships and two NDRF ships had been
activated or were being activated to support Operation Desert
Shield. This thesis was begun in late August 1990 and due to
time limitations will concentrate on the RRF vessels that were
activated prior to the end of August 1990. Although RRF
vessels from all three regions were activated to support
Operation Desert Shield, this thesis will only study those
vessels activated in the Western Region due to location and
availability of information. This thesis will also include
past activations of Western Region RRF vessels as a source of
comparison with current activations.
C . METHODOLOGY
The methodology of this thesis is the study of reports and
messages from the organizations involved in the RRF
activations as well as information from other sources such as
interviews, government publications, Congressional hearings,
and past theses from the Naval Postgraduate School and the
Army Command and General Staff College. Information from
these sources was assembled to form a thorough study of the
topic using the most current information available.
D. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I
serves as an introduction to the thesis. Chapter II provides
background information about the RRF and the process for
activation of RRF vessels. Chapter III analyzes current
activations in support of Operation Desert Shield with an
emphasis on the problems encountered in the following six
areas: condition at breakout, engineering, crew, workforce
resources available for breakout, parts and stores, and
bunkering. Chapter IV first discusses problems encountered in
a prior simultaneous activation of three Western Region RRF
vessels. It then discusses past activations of three vessels
from the previous chapter using the same six areas of
discussion. Chapter V analyzes the problems encountered
during the activations discussed in the previous two
chapters. It also compares problems in past activations with
those of the current activations and provides recommendations
drawn from the information discussed in the thesis.
II . BACKGROUND
Mobilization of military forces during a time of national
emergency requires the movement of vast quantities of cargo to
the area of conflict. The fact that sealift capability is a
vital source for transporting military cargoes during time of
conflict is reflected in the following:
The overwhelming bulk of tonnage supporting ground troops
in an overseas theater of operations must come from ocean
transport. This has been true of every conflict since the
War of 1812... The Military Airlift Command ... and Civil
Reserve Air Fleet... are assets of irreplaceable value in
the initial stages of war, but they are dwarfed by the
total tonnage requirements necessary to sustain armies,
navies and air forces throughout a sustained conflict.
[Ref. l:p. 85]
During a time of national emergency 95 percent of all U.S.
military cargoes must be transported by sea with the other
five percent transported by air. [Ref 2]
This chapter will briefly discuss the sources of strategic
sealift available during time of conflict. It will then
discuss the purpose of the RRF and describe the
activation/deactivation process for RRF vessels.
A. SOURCES OF STRATEGIC SEALIFT CAPACITY
The sources of strategic sealift capacity are the Military
Sealift Command (MSC)
,
Ready Reserve Force (RRF), U.S. Flag
Merchant Fleet, Effective U.S. Control Fleet, National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , Allied Shipping, and Angary. Each of




Vessels available for strategic sealift controlled by
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) include prepositioned
ships, ships under long-term charters, and specialized
government-owned ships kept in a reduced operational status.
[Ref. 3]
2 Raady Reserve Forca
The RRF is a fleet of strategic sealift vessels held
in reserve for quick-response situations. A detailed
description of the purpose of the RRF and the activation
process for RRF vessels is provided in Section B below.
3. U.S. Flag Merchant Flaat
During mobilization in time of conflict, all U.S. flag
vessels can be requisitioned for strategic sealift use.
Vessels receiving government subsidies are available to MSC
upon request as described below:
All U.S. flag vessels that receive, or have received
federal subsidies, such as Construction Differential
Subsidies. . .or Operational Differential Subsidies. . .funds,
and 50 [percent] of the capacity of any U.S. operator's
fleet that carries military cargo under MSC contract, are
parties to the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) . This
program is administered by MSC, and all vessels in the SRP
are available to MSC upon request, under conditions short
of mobilization. [Ref. 3:p. 11]
4.
Effective U.S. Control Fleet
Vessels that are owned by the U.S., but registered
under foreign flags, are called the Effective U.S. Control
Fleet. These vessels are requisitionable assets for use in
strategic sealift. [Ref. 3:p. 12]
5. National Defense Reserve Fleet
The NDRF is made up of older vessels that can be
activated in time of national emergencies for both military
and nonmilitary shipping crises. Activation times for NDRF
vessels is significantly greater than for vessels in the RRF.
[Ref. 4]
€ . Allied Shipping
In the case of general war with the Soviet Union, the
U.S. would expect strategic sealift support from NATO
countries.
7 . Angary
Angary is a last resort method of obtaining sealift
assets. It is described below:
Angary is a practice in customary international law, also
authorized in U.S. law, whereby belligerent states may
exercise the power of requisition over neutral ships, but
not crews, in their territorial waters. [Ref 3:p. 14]
It is not likely that the U.S. would use this method to obtain
strategic sealift assets.
B. READY RESERVE FORCE
The RRF is a component of the NDRF. It is composed of
vessels having the most military value, maintained in an
advanced state of readiness for quick activation in time of
national conflict. The RRF program was established in
November of 1976 and is administered by MARAD. [Ref . 5:p. 41]
As of September 1, 1990, the RRF consisted of 96 vessels [Ref.
6] . The Maritime Administration states the purpose of the RRF
as follows:
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) . . .has grown to represent a
significant portion of the U.S. early deployment
capability. the Department of Defense (DOD) has
determined that there is a need for a Ready Reserve Force
composed of approximately 142 inspected and certified
oceangoing ships of various types and classes, capable of
full operational status within [five], [ten], or 20 days
following notification. The RRF is a key element of the
Navy's Strategic Sealift Program designed to provide
assured, responsive shipping to support the rapid
worldwide deployment of U.S. military forces. It is
structured for quick response (ship availability) beyond
that readily obtainable from U.S. commercial shipping.
[Ref. 7:p. 1]
The Maritime Administration maintains RRF vessels in a
five, ten or 20 day readiness status through the use of
memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) . In addition
to these MOU's, each RRF vessel has an American-flag ship
management company acting on behalf of MARAD as the Ship
Manager or General Agent (GA) for the vessel during all phases
of RRF activities [Ref. 7]
.
C. RRF ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION PROCESS
Vessels in the RRF can be activated on either a No-Notice
or Service basis. All of the RRF activations in support of
Operation Desert Shield were No-Notice activations. MARAD
tries to activate each RRF vessel a minimum of once every five
years for at least 30 days. In addition to ensuring that
machinery remains operational, the activations give maritime
personnel experience operating the older equipment found on
RRF vessels. [Ref. l:p. 119]
The classification for the readiness category which each
vessel is in takes into account the age and condition of the
vessel, the preservation method used during deactivation and
lay-up, and the results of ABS surveys conducted during lay-
up. This determines whether a vessel is placed in the five-,
ten-, or 20-day readiness category. [Ref. 8:p. 7]
A seven phase program was developed by MARAD to satisfy
the five-, ten-, or 20-day activation requirements. The seven
phases are as follows:
• Phase I Acquisition
• Phase II Upgrade
• Phase III Deactivation
• Phase IV Maintenance
• Phase V Exercise
• Phase VI Sealift Enhancement Features
• Phase Operation
The Upgrade, Deactivation, Maintenance, Exercise, and
Operation phases of the activation and deactivation process
are the most relevant to the topic of this thesis and are
described below. Detailed information concerning those phases
not covered below is contained in references seven and eight.
Appendices A and B list the surveys and inspections required
by ABS and USCG respectively, along with their periodicities.
1 . Phase II - Upgrade
a. ABS Procedures
During this phase, vessels that are not ABS classed
undergo required surveys and conversions as necessary. For
vessels that are ABS classed the following applies:
Existing ABS classed vessels will undergo surveys and
repairs necessary to ensure that the vessel is capable of
steaming continuously in unrestricted operations for at
least 180 days in execution of its assigned sealift
mission. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
All major surveys due within one year of assignment to RRF
status are conducted during this phase. Appendix A lists all
surveys conducted by ABS and their periodicity.
Each vessel is drydocked during this phase for
survey and repairs. During drydocking the following is to be
accomplished:
• Sea chests and sea valves to be opened for examination and
coating.
• Anchor chains to be ranged and gauged.
• Plating below waterline is to be ultrasonically gauged in
accordance with the requirements of the next Special
Periodic Survey of Hull.
• Underwater body to be specially cleaned and coated in
accordance with MARAD's current specifications for vessels
entering long term lay-up.
• Portable blanks are to be prepared for fitting over
underwater openings
.
• Marks are to be placed on the vessel's bottom and side
shell plating to facilitate orienting divers when carrying
out Underwater Inspection In Lieu of Drydocking Survey.
These are to include specific areas of plating, sea
openings, propeller blade surfaces, and rudder surfaces.
• Provisions are to be made to the stern tube bearings and
their sealing arrangements in accordance with current
MARAD specifications for the anticipated long term lay-up.
[Ref. 8:p. 2]
b. USCG Procedures
During the upgrade phase the USCG ensures that the
vessel may be safely operated as intended in accordance with
applicable laws, rules, and regulations by verifying that it
meets the requirements for Certificate of Inspection (COI) .
If the vessel's COI will expire within one year after being
assigned to the RRF, MARAD shall request that the USCG conduct
an inspection for certification. [Ref. 7:p. 2]
2. Phase III - Deactivation
a. ABS Procedures
During the deactivation phase, the ABS ensures that
the Ship Manager properly prepares the vessel for lay-up.
Vessels are to be prepared for active retention as follows:
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• Dehumidification systems capable of maintaining the
relative humidity at 38 to 41 percent are to be installed
in the following locations:
a. Engineroom, steering gear spaces and workshop.
b. Living quarters, navigation spaces, galleys,
and storerooms.
c. Motor generator control spaces.
d. Other spaces deemed appropriate.
• A suitable cathodic protection system for the hull is to
be fitted.
• Suitable systems to detect flooding and sound an alarm are
to be installed in the engineroom, shaft alley and any
other spaces considered appropriate.
• The hull, decks, deck houses, machinery and equipment are
to be lubricated, painted or otherwise preserved as
required to assure the they do not deteriorate during
extended periods of inactivity and exposure to weather.
Exterior openings, including uptakes are to be covered or
otherwise effectively sealed against weather.
• Cargo gear including booms, blocks, runners, etc. are to
be properly painted, preserved and stowed to minimize the
harmful effects of non-use and exposure to the elements.
• Plating in way of the last two frame spaces in the shaft
alley including the tank top, bilge well and the after
peak bulkhead up to the top of the sterntube is to be




When a vessel is placed in lay-up in the
deactivation phase, the Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine
Inspection (OCMI) takes custody of the COI and maintains a
file containing the COI, copies of all requirements (CG-835)
issued to the vessel, and other applicable correspondence
concerning that vessel. [Ref. 7:p. 2]
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3 . Phase IV - Maintenance
The Maintenance phase is for the period when the RRF
vessel is in lay-up. The requirements of this phase are meant
to ensure that equipment is preserved in the best condition
possible during the extended period of idleness. The periodic
surveys and inspections listed in Appendices A and B are
designed to operate and test the major machinery. In addition
to the periodic surveys and inspections required by ABS and
USCG, the following actions are taken during the maintenance
phase:
• Preventive maintenance and repair procedures are to be
developed and employed during this phase to ensure the
systematic exercising, maintenance, inspection and testing
of the various systems and equipment. Appropriate records
of the maintenance and tests carried out are to be
maintained by MARAD/GA and are to be available to ABS upon
request.
• The hull, deck, deck houses and appurtenances are to be
routinely inspected by MARAD/GA and maintained in a good
state of preservation and appearance.
• Cargo handling equipment is to be periodically operated by
MARAD/GA to verify its readiness. The equipment is to be
periodically represerved as required to maintain it in
good state of preservation.
• Hatch covers are to be periodically inspected, operated
and repaired as necessary to ensure a good state of
preservation, weathertight integrity and operational
status
.
• The vessels will be maintained in accordance with
applicable ABS, Coast Guard and other regulatory




4 . Phase V - Exercise
When directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, MARAD
initiates the activation of RRF vessels. When it receives
notice to activate a vessel, MARAD notifies its regional and
field offices, Ship Managers/General Agents, seafaring union
headquarters, Reserve Fleet sites, and inspection
organizations via telephone. The Ship Manager/General Agent
is responsible for manning the vessel. This is done through
the specific unions which the Ship Manager/General Agent has
made arrangements with. The unions contact the individual
mariners to fill the billets on each ship. [Ref. 9]
a. Ship Manager Duties
The duties of the Ship Manager/General Agent
include the following:
• Procure the ship's Master, subject to the National
Shipping Authority's approval, as an agent and employee of
the U.S. government
.
• Procure and make available to the Master, for engagement
by him, the officers and crew required.
• Equip, victual, supply, and repair the vessel.
• Develop activation specifications in coordination with
MARAD Cognizant Regional Director and Ship Operations
Officer.
• Hire tugboats and pilots and pay canal tolls.
• Appoint part agents at all ports for husbanding the ship.
• Relay voyage instructions directly to the Master, as may
be required.
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• Assist, as required, in obtaining all appropriate and
applicable certification and documentation for the ship,




The ABS ensures that all necessary surveys and
tests are conducted during the activation process so that the
vessel will be able to conduct sustained operations for at
least 180 days. Each RRF vessel activated during the exercise
phase is required to conduct a full power and sea trial. The
ABS Surveyor will witness the operation of all of the vessel's
equipment and systems to verify satisfactory operation. [Ref.
8]
c. USCG Duties
When MARAD is directed to activate RRF vessels it
notifies the OCMI the shipyard at which the vessel will be
activated, and whether it is in a five-, ten- or 20-day
readiness status. The OCMI makes sure that deficiencies are
corrected and conducts various safety inspections as follows:
• Conducts a deficiency check to ensure that outstanding
requirements issued during the Phase IV Maintenance period
have been corrected. Deficiencies that cannot be
corrected because of time constraints to meet operational
requirements of the DOD may be deferred until after the
activation provided no serious deficiencies remain which
would affect the seaworthiness or safety of the vessel and
its personnel.
• Conducts operational testing of equipment and systems as
required for reissuing of the COI including testing of
14
fire pumps, steering motors, generators, safety valves,
relief valves, fire hoses, liferafts, lifejackets, etc.
Upon correction of any outstanding requirements, testing
of vital systems, and/or issuance of any waivers, the OCMI
will deliver the COI
.
[Ref. 7:pp. 3-4]
5 . Phase - Operation
When the vessel successfully passes all surveys and
inspections it is tendered to MSC for operational control.
MARAD is still responsible for maintaining the vessels in ABS
class and Coast Guard certification during this phase even
though the vessel is under MSC operational control. [Ref.
7:p. 4]
€ . Activation Reports
Several reports are produced during and following the
activation of RRF vessels. During the activation, MARAD
produces Situation Reports (SITREPS) every six hours. When
the activation is completed, MARAD combines these SITREPS to
produce a Quick Look Report. After the vessel has completed
its operations and operational control has been returned to
MARAD, MSC produces an After Action Report which discusses
problems from the exercise and operation phases. The Ship
Manager/General Agent produces voyage reports at the
completion of the operation phase.
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III. ACTIVATION OF READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS
This chapter will examine the problems encountered during
the activations of the first nine RRF vessels from the MARAD
Western Region activated in support of Operation Desert
Shield. The discussion of each vessel will begin with a brief
description of that vessel and its condition when ordered to
be broken out. The major problems from the activations are
then discussed in the following areas:
• Condition at breakout.
• Engineering.
• Crew.
• Workforce resources available for breakout.
• Parts and stores.
• Bunkering.
A. ACTIVATION OF COMET
The COMET is an ex-USNS C3-ST-14a design Roll-On Roll-Off
(RO/RO) vessel with steam propulsion. It was built in 1958
and was placed into the RRF in March of 1985. Since it was an
ex-USNS vessel, MSC was responsible for the COMET'
s
deactivation procedure before placement in the RRF, and MARAD
had less control over its material condition when it was
turned over. As a result, the COMET was in fairly rough
16
condition when it was placed in lay-up. The COMET was never
activated until Operation Desert Shield. [Ref. 10]
The Ready Reserve Force Status Report from MARAD stated
that at the time of breakout, "COMET requires combustion
control repairs." [Ref. 11 :p. 6]
The COMET was located at Swan Island, Portland, Oregon, at
the time of activation in a five-day readiness status.
Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime Administration
received notification to activate the COMET at 0615 PDT on
August 10, 1990. The ship manager for the COMET is American
President Lines and the activation yard was Cascade General
.
The COMET was in a nest of ships at the time of activation and
was moved to working pier 305. Two other ships in the same
nest were activated simultaneously with the COMET. Due to the
fact that the COMET was the last ship to leave the berth, it
did not leave the berth until 2000 PDT August 10, 1990. The
COMET was conditionally tendered to Military Sealift Command
at 0330 PDT on August 25, 1990. The activation process took
a total of 14 days, 21 hours, and 15 minutes. The following
problems were experienced during the activation of the COMET:
[Ref. 12]
1 . Condition At Breakout
a . Gauges
Many pressure gauges and thermometers were missing
or broken. A large number of the gauges that were present
17
were uncalibrated. Electrical meters were also unreliable due
to lack of calibration. It is crucial that a crew unfamiliar
with an engineering plant have reliable gauges when trying to
light off. [Ref. 12:p. 2]
Jb
. Lighting
Missing or burnt out light bulbs and electrical
shorts resulted in the lighting system throughout the ship
being out of order at the start of the activation. Good
lighting makes the difficult task of tracing systems less
complicated. The recommendation was that, "The Phase IV
should ensure that all lighting systems are fully functional."
[Ref. 12:p. 2]
C. Frozen Starboard Scoop Valve
The ABS survey reports showed that the starboard
scoop gate valve was a new valve that had been installed at
lay up. The valve was found to be frozen after removing the
underwater blank. This frozen valve resulted in conditional
acceptance by MSC. The ship manager was able to use divers to
free the valve when the ship made a call in Los Angeles for
other repairs. The lesson learned from this was, "Do not
remove any blanks until you are sure the valve is free."
[Ref. 12:p. 4]
d. Salt Nater Service System
A damage control plug in the suction side left over
from when the sea chests were painted prior to blanking was
18





The packing material in valves throughout the
system were dried out from the dehumidification phase causing
the valves to leak. The dried out packing material caused
normal corrective action, taking up on the gland, to be
ineffective in most cases. Whenever the boiler was shut down
unexpectedly, as many valves as possible were completely
repacked. [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
f. Manuals
Instruction books essential for activation were
missing. Without instruction books, some operations had to be
accomplished on a trial and error basis. There was only one
operating manual aboard. The recommendation was that, "It
should be the practice to insure at least three (3) copies be
aboard and where possible plastic coated copies of systems
piping diagrams." [Ref. 12: pp. 2-3]
g. Sounding Tubes
Some sounding tubes were plugged or mislabeled in
both the fuel oil and ballast systems. Unreliable sounding
tubes resulted in refueling by opening manholes for sounding.
The fill and suction lines for number five deep tank were
completely shut. Investigation revealed that the tank had
been blanked for an air test and repairs to the tank tip, and
19
the blanks were never removed after the work was completed.
The following recommendation was made:
In regards to sounding tubes, a verification should be
made as part of Phase IV. Bottom soundings should be made
of all tanks and checked against the design tube lengths
as proof of clear tubes. In addition, plastic coated
listings should be available of sounding tube locations so
that when a green crew comes aboard they have useful
information to work from. It would be helpful to have
color coded areas of deck painted in way of the tubes to
assist in locating them. Vent terminals on deck should
also be color coded and marked as to what tank they serve.
Most label plates have been painted over or are gone.
[Ref. 12:p. 4]
h Rmmch Rods
Several reach rods were mislabeled. In order to
correct the problem several ballast tanks had to be dumped.
[Ref. 12:p. 4]
i . Bilge Nells
The bilge wells were full of debris and scale
throughout the ship. The recommendation was that:
They should be maintained in a clean condition and at some
time after initial dehumidification, hammered to drop as
much scale into the rosebox as possible and re-cleaned.
[Ref. 12:p. 6]
j . Kmys
There was no key locker or individual keys for any
accommodations or store rooms. There were about four master
keys aboard the vessel. The lack of keys led to several cases
of theft of personal effects and ships stores being brought
aboard. The recommendation was that, "Arriving crew members
must have some place to stow their gear." [Ref. 12 :p. 3]
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k. GAllmy Equipment
Galley equipment is very important to successful
activation.
I cannot emphasize strongly enough the absolute need to
get habitability up and running early in the activation.
This is not only from a cost viewpoint but from the
essential morale viewpoint. [Ref. 12 :p. 5]
Due to the condition of drains, potable water, and steam for
dishwashers, the galley could not be used to cook a meal for
the crew until August 17.
1 . Mattresses
All of the mattresses on the ship had to be
replaced. An American President Line representative ordered
new mattresses and within 36 hours enough were aboard to
support the crew of 35. [Ref. 12 :p. 5]
a. Air Conditioners
At the start of the activation 15 spaces were air
conditioned using portable window units which were found to be
unreliable. When some of the crew members arrived they
threatened to walk off the ship unless they had proper
quarters including air conditioning. In order to satisfy the
requirement, 33 window-type air conditioning units were
ordered and placed aboard. [Ref. 12:pp. 5-6]
n. Ice Makers
There were two ice makers aboard and both had to be
replaced. [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
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o. Ventilation In The Quarters
Ventilation in the quarters and cargo holds was
unsatisfactory. Oscillating fans for the quarters were found
in a locker and had to be installed along with some that had
to be purchased. [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
2 . Engineering
a. Combustion Control
A contractor was in the process of completely
renewing the combustion control system when activation was
ordered. Although the contractor finished the work by late
the second day, the combustion control system could not be
adjusted until the boilers were steady steaming. The lack of
proper adjustment of the combustion control system resulted in
imperfect combustion control during light off and start up.
[Ref. 12:p. 3]
b. Emission Control Regulations
The initial inspection of the boilers showed clean
fire side and superheater tubes and recent brick repairs.
Local rules in the Port of Portland prohibiting blowing of
tubes in port led to major casualties in the boilers.
After initial light off and several days of steaming, we
lost the boilers due to soot buildup across the air
heaters of both boilers and bridging across the
superheater of the port boiler. As a result, the engine
room became increasingly obnoxious because of numerous
casing leaks. As long as there was no back pressure, the
leaks were not apparent. During this period, we had a
fire in the inner casing around the registers which
ultimately burnt a hole through the casing floor. It took
approximately 4 8 hours to effect necessary repairs which
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included air cleaning the starboard boiler, and after
smoke bombs, repairs to the casings. The port boiler
required a thorough water washing followed by smoke bombs
and casing repairs and a slow fire to dry out the boiler
prior to bringing it on line. The local rules prohibit
blowing of tubes in the Port of Portland and we knew that
with combustion problems we could be in further
difficulty. We prevailed upon CDR Kasky, the CO. of MSC
to use his influence with the EPA quality control people.
Within an hour, we had the necessary waiver to permit
unlimited soot blowing after dark and if necessary during
daylight. [Ref. 12 :p. 3]
c. Steam Regulating Valves
Steam regulating valves were a continuing problem
starting at light off. The problem was intensified due to a
lack of technical help from the start. Clogged steam
strainers and scale in the steam lines led to substantial work
and continuing problems. Lighting off and bringing the plant
on the line cannot be accomplished without properly operating
regulators and control valves. [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
d. Emergency Diesel
Once minor start-up problems were corrected the
emergency diesel appeared to be operating properly. Blow by
was discovered after substantial use in a loaded condition and
the diesel had to be overhauled in Los Angeles. It was
recommended that, "In the future we should, at some point,
take compression readings as a minimum to ascertain the
condition of the diesel." [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
3 . Crew
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
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4.
Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
a. Skillmd Labor
During a massive breakout, such as that in support
of Operation Desert Shield, the availability of skilled labor
is a general problem. This was especially true at Cascade
because they had two commercial tankers under repair at the
time of activation. [Ref. 12 :p. 7]
b. Divmrs
Some time was lost during the activation because
with three ships being activated in the same port there were
not enough divers to provide services simultaneously to the
three ships. [Ref. 12 :p. 7]
5 Parts And Stores
a. VmmsBl Oh-inventoried
The fact that the vessel was un-inventoried was a
major problem until the job of storekeeper was manned on an
around the clock basis. Most of the parts needed for the
activation were found aboard, although it was difficult at
first to tell what parts were available aboard. MSC will try
to replace those parts used from on board spares with spares
still in existence for this vessel on the East Coast. [Ref.
12:p. 2]
b. Lack Of A Prm-Sst Stores List
Each department ordered what it thought it needed
because there was no pre-set stores list. Since time was
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short they ordered what they thought they needed without
looking to see what was aboard. It was recommended that:
At some point a check should be made and at inactivation
materials, such as tools, etc., removed and placed in a
safe place for future use on any activation. If we leave
it aboard, it will be lost. [Ref. 12 :p. 5]
6 . Bunkering
Bunkering is a term for refueling. No significant
problems in this area were encountered.
7 . Summary
The COMET was not successfully activated within the
required five day time limitation. Numerous engineering
problems caused major delays in the activation process. The
COMET had not been activated since it was placed in the RRF,
and the length of time spent in lay-up caused a great deal of
deterioration in the engineering spaces, especially to
gaskets. Steaming the boilers with newly installed combustion
control equipment and without blowing tubes caused problems
resulting in several days of delays.
B. ACTIVATION OF SS CAPE ISABEL
The SS CAPE ISABEL is a C7-S-95a design RO/RO vessel with
steam propulsion. It was built in 1976 and was placed in the
RRF in June of 1986. CAPE ISABEL was fairly new, and in
fairly good condition when it was placed in the RRF. CAPE
ISABEL was never activated until Operation Desert Shield.
[Ref. 10]
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The Ready Reserve Force Status Report stated that at the
time of breakout, "CAPE ISABEL requires ballast control system
repairs." [Ref. ll:p. 6]
CAPE ISABEL was located at berth 306, Swan Island,
Portland, Oregon, at the time of activation in a five day
readiness status. Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime
Administration received notification to activate the Isabel at
0615 PDT on August 10, 1990. The ship manager for the Isabel
is American President Lines and the activation contractor was
North West Marine. The Isabel was in a nest of ships at the
time of activation and was moved to working pier 301. The
CAPE ISABEL was tendered to Military Sealift Command at 1425
PDT on August 22, 1990 [Ref. 13] . The activation process took
a total of 12 days, eight hours, and ten minutes. The
following problems were experienced during the activation of
the CAPE ISABEL: [Ref. 14]
1 . Condition At Breakout
a . Gasket
s
The gaskets and packing material in the machinery
spaces were in unexpectedly deteriorated condition at the time
of activation. The condition of the gaskets and packing
material was most likely caused by the dehumidification
process. All deteriorated gaskets and packing material were
replaced. [Ref. 14:p. 3]
26
b. Ballast System
Continuous repairs were made to the controls and
valves of the ballast system throughout the activation
process. Although the problems were thought to be corrected
at the time the ship left for sea, it was later learned that
they persisted. [Ref. 14 :p. 3]
2 . Engineering
a. Superheater Header Handhole Gaskets
Superheater header handhole gaskets leaked during
boiler hydro testing. These gaskets had been renewed during
the lay up process and appeared to be tight when air tested to
100 PSI. The boilermakers furnished and renewed all
superheater gaskets. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
b. Salt water Service System
Several leaks were discovered throughout the salt
water service system when it was started. The most
substantial problem was a leak in a four-inch evaporator feed
line. This feed line was made of PVC from the ship's original
construction. After repeated unsuccessful attempt to repair
leaks in the same joints, copper nickel lines were installed
and the system was placed into service. This problem,
including a salt water service pump which became flooded and
had to be rewound, resulted in three days delay in engineering
plant operations. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
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c. Unable To Raise Steam Pressure Above 100 PSI
A problem raising steam pressure above 100 PSI was
experienced during one of the boiler light offs. A sounding
of the starboard fuel oil settling tank revealed a clear
liquid on the sounding tape. This clear liquid may have
caused improper combustion resulting in the difficulty raising
boiler pressure. This clear liquid may have been lube oil,
hydraulic oil, water or a mixture of any of these. Removing
this contamination from the tank solved the problem. [Ref.
14:p. 2]
d. Blocked Fuel Oil Heaters
Both of the fuel oil heaters were blocked. The
apparent cause for the blockage was solidified fuel. The
heaters were cleared by soaking with solvent and circulating
solvent through them. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
e. Unable To Clean Baskets Of Duplex Strainer
The fuel oil duplex strainer could not be isolated
to allow cleaning of one of the baskets of the strainer. The
strainer was disassembled twice to determine why one side of
the strainer could not be isolated from the other to allow
debris to be cleared from the basket. The problem was found
to be a valve plug that was over-traveling on both sides
preventing either side from being isolated from the other.
Repairs were made to the valve plug and the duplex strainer
was put into operation. [Ref. 14 :p. 2]
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f. Feed Pumps
A joint in the feed pump suction line failed and
had to be repaired. After the repairs were completed, the
cover gasket blew out on the idle feed pump. The main feed
stop-check valve on the idle pump was found to be leaking
which caused the cover gasket to blow out. The main feed
stop-check valve was repaired and the cover gasket on the idle
feed pump replaced. [Ref. 14 :p. 3]
g. Rmllmf Valves
Three relief valves were found to be blowing by and
had to be removed for repairs. These relief valves were from
the 35 PSI steam system, the DC heater shell, and the
Butterworth heater. [Ref. 14 :p. 3]
Ji. Aft Turbine Generator
The aft turbine generator had a wiped thrust
bearing which had to be replaced. [Ref. 14 :p. 3]
i
. Forward Turbine Generator
The output from the forward turbine generator could
not be brought above 1,000 KW. An adjustment in the
electronic governor inside the hydraulic power supply assembly
solved the problem. [Ref. 14 :p. 3]
j . Evaporators
Both of the evaporators were problems from
beginning to end of the activation. The evaporators were
opened and hydro-tested when it was discovered that SS JUPITER
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was experiencing problems with her evaporators (see section F
below) . The hydro-tests revealed no leaks in the evaporators.
It was difficult to maintain the temperatures and the amount
of evaporator feed water when operating the evaporators. The
problem was found to be insufficient pressure from the feed
pumps to the evaporator eductors. Increasing this pressure




The delay in some of the crew arriving, especially
engineering personnel, caused delay in the activation process.
[Ref. 14:p. 3]
4
. Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
This was the first RRF activation that North West
Marine performed and some delay was caused by the contractor's
inexperience. [Ref. 14 :p. 3]
5 . Parts and Stores
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
6 . Bunkering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
7 . Summary
The activation of the CAPE ISABEL was not completed
within the required five-day time limitation. The CAPE ISABEL
had never been activated since it was placed in the RRF. The
extended lay-up period was most likely the cause of the
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deteriorated condition of the engineering plant which lead to
numerous delays.
C. ACTIVATION OF MV CAPE EDMONT
The MV CAPE EDMONT is a class G-0 design foreign
construction RO/RO vessel with diesel propulsion. It has a
controllable pitch propeller, bridge control and bow and stern
thrusters. The CAPE EDMONT was built in 1971 and was placed
in the RRF in April of 1987. The CAPE EDMONT was well used
and was in very rough condition when it was reflagged. An
extensive, ten-month reflagging procedure and a lot of work by
MARAD over the past three years to improve the CAPE EDMONT'
S
condition resulted in fair condition at the time of breakout.
A service activation of CAPE EDMONT was ordered in February of
1988, but was canceled by MSC the same day. It was never
activated again since being placed in the RRF. [P.ef. 10]
The Ready Reserve Force Status Report stated the following
about the condition of CAPE EDMONT at the time of breakout:
CAPE EDMONT requires repairs to [starboard] 18 [ton] deck
crane damaged by failure of drum clamps during ABS Annual
Cargo Gear Survey. [Ref. 11 :p. 6]
The CAPE EDMONT was located at Swan Island, Portland,
Oregon, at the time of activation in a five-day readiness
status. Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime
Administration received notification to activate the CAPE
EDMONT at 615 PDT on August 10, 1990. The ship manager for
the CAPE EDMONT is Interocean Management Corporation and the
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activation yard was Cascade General. The CAPE EDMONT was
conditionally tendered to Military Sealift Command at 1720 PDT
on August 23. The activation process took a total of 13 days,
11 hours and five minutes. The following problems were
experienced during the activation of the CAPE EDMONT: [Ref.
15]
1 . Condition At Breakout
Fuel in bunker and service tanks was contaminated at
the time of breakout. The contaminated fuel caused major
problems with clogging in fuel strainers for the main engines
and generators. The fuel was consolidated and stripped into
a holding tank and offloaded. [Ref. 16]
2 . Engineering
a. Aft Ship's Service Diesel Generator (SSDG)
Contaminated fuel was found to be the cause of
difficulties experienced while trying to start the aft SSDG.
Disposal of the contaminated fuel resolved the problem. [Ref.
15:p. 1]
b. Fuel Line
After leaving for sea trials a fuel oil line
failed, spilling fuel oil in the engineroom. This fuel oil
spill caused the ship to return to the pier for repairs and
cleanup of the oil. [Ref. 15 :p. 2]
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3 . Crew
The CAPE EDMONT was activated in 13 days, 11 hours and
five minutes. The activation process could have been
shortened by several days if an experienced crew had been
available at the time of activation. One example is that the
ship was on its own power in the morning of August 12th with
oilers standing watches because no engineers had reported
aboard yet. The lack of engineering personnel eventually
caused the postponement of dock trials scheduled for the




The Master was inexperienced on this type of
vessel, and his uncertainty led to delays in the activation.
The Quick Look report on the activation stated:
The Master had never sailed on, let alone commanded, a
motorship with a controllable pitch propeller, bridge
control, and bow and stern thrusters. Compounding the
problem, even with four tugs alongside, he was unwilling
to take bridge control, as is required on this ship, and
'get the feel' of how it handles. Rather than working
with the Ship Manager's port engineer, the MARAD Surveyor
and the various tech reps, he ran to the USCG every time
he perceived a problem. The steady flow of misinformation
he provided the local COTP was a major factor in the many
hours of delays, and the requirement to flat tow the
vessel over 80 miles down the Columbia River to the
seabouy before sea trials could commence. [Ref. 15 :p. 2]
b. Chief Engineer
The Chief Engineer did not arrive until August 13.
The Chief Engineer's late arrival and inexperience hindered
the activation process. The Quick Look report reported:
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The Chief Engineer had no experience with this type of
plant and was not of the caliber necessary to ensure rapid
breakout and effective operation of the ship. [Ref. 15 :p.
3]
c . Vmmmml Crmw
The entire crew was inexperienced with this type of
vessel, especially the engineers. The engineers'
unfamiliarity with the engineering plant was a prominent
problem throughout the activation. To try and overcome this
problem the Western Region of MARAD suggested,
That consultant engineers be hired from the vessel's
former owners to assist in activation, sea trials and at
least the first voyage. [Ref. 15 :p. 2]
This suggestion, however, met with a great deal of opposition.
The difficulty in manning the vessel in a timely manner
caused many delays in the activation process. It is likely
that even if the vessel had been in perfect material condition
it would not have been ready for sea trials at the beginning
of day five due to lack of personnel.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout




No significant problems in this area were encountered.
€ . Bunkering
MSCPAC required the vessel to bunker full prior to
leaving for sea trials. This requirement meant that key
personnel had to be taken away from other jobs relating to the
activation for the bunkering operation. This requirement for
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full bunkering prior to sea trials caused additional fatigue
to an already weary crew. [Ref. 15:p. 3]
7 . Summary
The CAPE EDMONT was not successfully activated within
the required five-day time limitation. Although the vessel
had not been activated since it was placed in the RRF in 1986,
the main cause of delays in activation were caused by
personnel and not machinery. Lack of experience with the
foreign built engineering equipment on the part of the crew
and shipyard personnel alike caused many delays in the
activation process.
D. ACTIVATION OF METEOR
The METEOR is an ex-USNS C4-ST-67a design RO/RO type of
ship with steam propulsion. The METEOR was built in 1967 and
was placed in the RRF in October of 1985. Like the COMET, the
METEOR was turned over to MARAD by MSC. Since MSC was
responsible for the deactivation, MARAD was unable to provide
a work list of items to be corrected prior to being placed in
the RRF. The result was that METEOR was in rough condition
when placed in the RRF. The METEOR was never activated until
Operation Desert Shield. [Ref. 10]
The Ready Reserve Force Status Report stated that at the
time of breakout, "METEOR may be limited to single shaft
operations and max speed of 12 [knots]." [Ref. ll:p. 6]
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The METEOR was located at ex-Todd Shipyard (inactive) , San
Pedro, California at the time of activation in a five day
readiness status. Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime
Administration received notification to activate the METEOR at
0615 PDT on August 10, 1990. The ship manager for the METEOR
is Interocean Management Corporation and the activation yard
was Southwest Marine, San Pedro, California. The METEOR was
activated at a shipyard berth and was docked at Southwest
Marine at 1430 PDT on August 10. The METEOR was tendered to
Military Sealift Command at 0100 PDT on August 25. The
activation process took a total of 14 days, 18 hours, and 45
minutes. The following problems were experienced during the
activation of the METEOR: [Ref. 17]
1 . Condition At Breakout
a. Burner Management System
A new burner management system was purchased before
the vessel was laid-up and placed in the RRF. This burner
management system was not installed when the vessel was placed
in the RRF. At the time of breakout the burner management
system was installed, but was not completely tested. This
problem is further discussed below (see section 2b.).
b. Pipea And Valves
Pipes and valves for many systems were in unusable
condition at the time of breakout. This problem is further
discussed below (see section 2a.).
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2 . Engineering
a. Pipe And Valve Renewal
Pipes and valves in many systems required renewal.
These systems included the following: sanitary, fresh water,
exhaust steam and drain piping, fuel oil filling lines, shower
fixtures, diesel cold start, toilet bowls, and sink faucets in
quarters. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
b . Burner Management System
A General Regulator burner management system was
purchased for the vessel by MSC prior to relinquishing control
to MARAD for use in the RRF. This burner management system,
later found in a cargo hold, was installed in 1989. [Ref.
17:p. 2]
Simulated tests were performed on the burner
management system after installation, but light off of the
boilers to properly test the system was cost prohibitive.
Upon light off for the activation it was discovered that the
new system had both factory and installation defects which
took ten days for Medland Controls to fix in order to make the
system reliable. [Ref. 18]
c. Emergency Switchboard
A bonnet gasket on a block valve failed during
testing of a fire line. The leak caused considerable damage
to the emergency switchboard. It was recommended that,
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The valve and line should not run through the emergency
diesel generator room; this line should be rerouted at
first opportunity. [Ref. 17 :p. 2]
d Shuft Vibration
Shaft alignment problems on the port main engine
caused heavy vibrations during shaft speeds of between zero
and 25 RPM. The vibrations diminished at speeds above 25 RPM
and could no longer be noticed above 40 RPM. It was
recommended that the shaft problem should be investigated and




Key crew members were late in reporting which
overloaded the Interocean Management Corporation Port Engineer
in his attempts to expedite the activation. Personnel
problems were compounded when the first Chief Engineer walked
off the ship after four days, and the second Chief Engineer
quit after five days. The Chief Engineer who eventually
sailed with the ship did not arrive until two days before the
voyage. [Ref. 17 :p. 2]
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
5 Parts And Stores
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
6 . Bunkering
The requirement to bunker the vessel full during the
activation and prior to sea trials added 24 hours to the
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activation. The increased workload this requirement placed on
an already fatigued crew resulted in the loss of 24 to 30
hours of productivity from the crew. [Ref. 17 :p. 2]
7 . Summary
The METEOR was not successfully activated within the
required five day time limitation. The METEOR had never been
activated since it was placed in the RRF in 1985. The
extended time in lay-up was most likely the cause of the
deteriorated condition of engineering equipment, especially
valves and piping systems. The burner management system which
had not been installed before the vessel was placed in lay-up
was the major cause of delay in the activation process. The
burner management system accounted for ten days delay in
activation.
E. ACTIVATION OF MV CAPE DUCATO
The MV CAPE DUCATO is a G-l design foreign construction
RO/RO type of vessel with diesel propulsion. It has a
controllable pitch propeller, bridge control, and bow and
stern thrusters . It was built in 1972 and was placed in the
RRF in December of 1985. The CAPE DUCATO was activated in
January of 198 6 for exercise Team Spirit '86, and in February
of 1988 for exercise Team Spirit '88 [Ref. 18]. The CAPE
DUCATO was in fair condition the last time it was deactivated.
[Ref. 10]
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The Ready Reserve Force Status Report stated that at the
time of breakout,
CAPE DUCATO main engines require testing and run-in
limiting speed to 16 [knots] for first 72 hours of
operation due to replacement of major engine components.
[Ref. ll:p. 6]
The CAPE DUCATO was located at ex-Todd Shipyard
(inactive)
, San Pedro, California at the time of activation in
a five day readiness status. Western Region Headquarters of
the Maritime Administration received notification to activate
the CAPE DUCATO at 0615 PDT on August 10, 1990. The ship
manager for the METEOR is Interocean Management Corporation
and the activation yard was Wilmington Iron Works, Wilmington,
California. The CAPE DUCATO was activated at the layberth.
Activating the CAPE DUCATO at the layberth saved at least four
hours that would have been required to move it .to an active
shipyard. The CAPE DUCATO was conditionally tendered to
Military Sealift Command at 1400 PDT on August 24. The total
activation time was 14 days, seven hours and 45 minutes. The
following problems were experienced during the activation of
the CAPE DUCATO: [Ref. 19]
1 . Condition At Breakout
The condition of key engineering equipment was unknown
at the time of breakout. The main engines and evaporators had
not been operated under a load since 1988. At the time of
activation the condition of the machinery for these systems
was unknown. At breakout it was not known that the injection
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timing on the main engines had been advanced during the
previous activation to compensate for worn out and broken fuel
oil pumps. When the main engines were operated unloaded they
appeared to be working properly. Only after a load was placed
on the main engines were the problems discovered (see section
2 c. below) . [Ref . 18]
2 . Engineering
a. Reduction Gear Lube Oil Pump
The removal, repair, and replacement of a reduction
gear lube oil pump caused a one day delay in sea trials.
[Ref. 19:p. 3]
b. Swedish Plant
The engineering plant was a Swedish design and none
of the engineers had ever operated that type of plant
previously. Until a Swedish engineer was found to act as a
consultant, the engineers had to learn the plant as they went
along. This caused approximately a one day delay during sea
trials. [Ref. 19:p. 3]
c. Fuel Delivery System
This was the most substantial problem during the
activation. The quick look report reported:
Fuel delivery problems to the main engines were
catastrophic to the activation, with the failed first sea
trial delaying the delivery of the vessel two days.
Engine loads would not balance and overheat conditions
indicative of timing and injection problems forced the
ship to return to San Pedro for repairs. During repairs
many problems were found with the fuel pumps and injection
nozzles, from poor settings to broken internal parts.
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Repairs were made, and timing and delivery was reset to
benchmark. During this time the PEC system [Pielstick
Engineering Control electropneumatic control system
attached to the governors of the three main engines to
balance the load between them] was completely cleaned out
and air signals balanced. This delay for repairs cost us
three days. [Ref. 19 :p. 3]
d . Evaporator
The evaporator could not be tested until the
problems with the main engines were corrected. This was due
to the evaporator using engine jacket water from the main
engine to heat the evaporator feed water. Once the evaporator
was tested it could not produce water due to scale in the
tubes and low vacuum. This problem was the reason for the
conditional acceptance by MSC and resulted in one day delay in
activation. [Ref. 19 :p. 4]
3 . Crew
a . Engineers
The Chief Engineer and a Third Assistant were on
the Maintenance Team for a year prior to the activation and
their knowledge of the plant was very beneficial during the
first few days of the activation. Unfortunately, this
knowledge did not carry over to operating the plant under a
load where unfamiliarity with the characteristics of the plant
led to many time consuming mistakes. The G-l type of plant is
complicated to operate and it was difficult to learn at the
time of activation.
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The rest of the licensed engineers were completely
inexperienced with this type of plant and did not start
arriving until the third day of the activation. The delay in
reporting for the licensed engineers delayed switching to
ship's power due to lack of watchstanders . This delay




The Radio Officer did not report until the fifth
day of the activation. The multiple activations throughout
the country in support of Operation Desert Shield had drained
the supply of personnel.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
5 . Parts And Stores
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
6 . Bunkering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
7 . Summary
The CAPE DUCATO was not successfully activated within
the required five day time limitation. Although the CAPE
DUCATO had been activated in 1986 for exercise Team Spirit '86
and in 1988 for exercise Team Spirit '88, it still experienced
major engineering problems during the activation. It appears
that the injection timing on the main diesel engines was
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advanced to make it operate for the previous activation to
compensate for worn out and broken fuel oil injection pumps.
The unknown condition of the engineering plant at the time of
activation lead to major problems with the fuel delivery
system and the Pielstick Engineering Control system.
Inexperience with the foreign built engineering equipment also
led to delays in the activation.
F. ACTIVATION OF SS JUPITER
The SS JUPITER is a C7-S-95a design RO/RO type of vessel
with steam propulsion. It was built in 1976 and was placed in
the RRF in April of 1986. The JUPITER is an ex-MSC vessel and
had never been activated since being placed in the RRF. It
was in fair condition when it was deactivated. [Ref . 10]
The Ready Reserve Force Status Report from MARAD stated at
the time of breakout that, "JUPITER requires modifications to
combustion control and ballast control systems." [Ref. 11 :p.
6]
The JUPITER was located at the Blair Waterway, Tacoma,
Washington, at the time of activation in a five day readiness
status. Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime
Administration received notification to activate the JUPITER
at 0615 PDT on August 10, 1990. The ship manager for the
JUPITER is American President Lines and the activation yard
was Todd Shipyard, Seattle, Washington. The JUPITER was towed
to Todd Shipyard and arrived at 0400 PDT on August 11. The
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JUPITER was tendered to Military Sealift Command at 2330 PDT
on August 19. The total activation time was nine days, 17
hours and 15 minutes. The following problems were experienced
during the activation of the JUPITER: [Ref. 20]
1 . Condition At Breakout
a. Location
The vessel's location at the time of breakout
caused a delay in the activation process. Towing the ship
from layberth to the shipyard took 21 hours and 45 minutes.
[Ref. 20:p. 2]
Jfc>. Sa.lt Water Pumps
Many salt water pumps were in deteriorated
condition from the time of previous service. [Ref. 16]
c. Evaporators
At the time of breakout, the evaporators were in
deteriorated condition either from improper lay-up or
deficient condition at the time of lay-up. The problem with




(1) Problems With Number One Evaporator. The
following problems were encountered on the number one




Blown first stage air ejector steam inlet line.
Rear first stage spray tower eroded at bottom of tubes and
leaked at the cap.
Second stage distillate leaking through window gasket.
Tube bundle interior gasket not lined up properly between
first and second stages
.
Suction side of the brine pump broken.
Header gasket not properly lined up.
Air ejectors were leaking.
First stage feed heater leaking.
Brine gate between stages improperly set.
Missing disc on two inch swing check from air ejector.
Drain line installed upside down and disc adrift in valve
for feed heater drain line.
Discharge check valve adrift in valve for distiller pump.
[Ref. 20:p. 2]
(2) Problems With Number Two Evaporator. The
number two evaporator unit was found to have ten leaking tubes
in the condenser. The Leslie first stage heater drain line
blew in two places when the unit was started due to a return
valve that was plugged solid. These problems were repaired
and the unit placed in operation. [Ref. 20 :p. 3]
b. Other Problems Causing Delays
The following are engineering problems that arose
unexpectedly during the activation:
• Blown gaskets on fuel oil and D.C. heater relief valves.
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• Metal particles found in strainers for number one and
number two air conditioning compressors resulted in
rebuilding both units.
• Boiler safety stuck open during setting of safety valves
for USCG required replacement.
• Salt water ballast valves and pneumatic operators were a
great problem.
• Fisher control valves and Leslie regulators deteriorated
internally.
• Throttle valves to the number one and number two turbine
generators were difficult to open under steam pressure.
• Transformer burned up for number one main circulation
pump.
• In port boiler feed pump had heavily scored plungers and
no special chevron packing was available locally.
• Main condenser loop seal rusted through.
• Steam line to port boiler sootblowers blew out.
[Ref. 20:p. 2]
c. Electric Motors
Two fuel oil service pumps, a fuel oil transfer
pump, and two main condensate pumps were electrically grounded
and had to be sent to a shop ashore. [Ref. 20 :p. 3]
d. Feed Line Discharge Check Valves
The bonnet gaskets started leaking on the main
boiler feed pump main and auxiliary feed line discharge check
valves. Repairs required the plant be secured for several
hours. [Ref. 20 :p. 3]
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e. Hydraulic Amplifiers
The plug- in wiring to the sending units for
hydraulic amplifiers were likely damaged by yard workers
blanking off a steam line to both turbine generators. This
problem was not detected until an attempt was made to start
the units. [Ref. 20 :p. 3]
3 . Crew
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
5 . Parts And Stores
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
6 . Bunkering
The requirement to bunker the vessel during the
activation phase and prior to sea trials caused the loss of 12
hours due to taking key personnel away from other activation
work. This also added to the fatigue of an already weary
crew. [Ref. 20 :p. 3]
7 . Summary
The JUPITER was not successfully activated within the
required five day time limitation. The JUPITER had never been
activated since placement in the RRF. The extended lay-up
period is the most likely cause of the numerous engineering
problems which cased delay in the activation. Towing the
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vessel from layberth to the shipyard also caused a delay of
almost a full day.
G. ACTIVATION OF MV CAPE HORN
The MV CAPE HORN is a G-2 design foreign construction
RO/RO type of vessel with diesel propulsion. It was built in
1979 and was placed in the RRF in December of 1986. The CAPE
HORN was activated in January of 1987 for exercise Team Spirit
'87, and in April of 1989 for exercise Cobra Gold '89. The
CAPE HORN was in fairly good condition at the time of breakout
since it had just completed the deactivation procedure. [Ref
.
10]
The CAPE HORN was located at berth 6 and 7 North Pier,
Hunters Point, San Francisco, California at the time of
activation in a five day readiness status. Western Region
Headquarters of the Maritime Administration received
notification to activate the CAPE HORN at 0615 PDT on August
10, 1990. The ship manager for the CAPE HORN is Interocean
Management Corporation and the activation yard was Southwest
Marine, San Francisco, California. The CAPE HORN was
activated at the layberth which saved at least four hours
towing time. The CAPE HORN was tendered to Military Sealift
Command at 1410 PDT on August 16. The total activation time
was six days, seven hours and 55 minutes. The following





The plan for activation and the specifications,
provided by the ship manager, were not current. Without a
current activation plan, guidelines for the activation had to
be drawn up on site as each problem occurred. [Ref. 21 :p. 2]
2 . Engineering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
3 . Crew
a. Full Manning
The full crew was not aboard until August 15.
Obtaining licensed officers was the major problem causing the
delay in full manning. Key personnel, including licensed
engineers and deck officers, were slow to arrive on board.
The lack of key personnel resulted in delayed light off of the
engineering plant and the diesel generators. [Ref. 21 :p. 2]
b Inexperience With Ship Type
The crew was new to this particular ship and had
only limited experience on this type of vessel. The ship is
foreign designed and none of the crew had ever sailed on a
vessel like it before. The crew's inexperience made it
difficult to operate the equipment. [Ref. 21: p. 2]
4 . Workforce Available For Breakout
m . Port Engineer
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A great deal of difficulty was experienced with the
Port Engineer for the ship manager. The quick look report
noted that,
The Port Engineer representing the ship manager, IOM
(Interocean Management Corporation)
,
probably is a well
qualified individual for any vessel under normal
circumstances, but was not suitable during the activation
period because he was not familiar with the ship. The
Port Engineer has not been on this type of vessel. This
resulted in many inefficiencies in activating the vessel
effectively. The activation was managed solely by one
full-time port engineer on-site with no back-up assistance
to relieve him at night. As a result planning and
scheduling suffered and fatigue affected performance and
judgement . Long hours with an inexperienced crew compound
the problem. [Ref. 21 :p. 2]
Jb. Repair Facility Personnel
Due to the nature of the nationwide activation of
the RRF, technical representatives were in short supply.
Experienced technicians with skills necessary to work on
critical equipment were not available on short notice.
Technicians that were available were unfamiliar with the
foreign-built equipment and could not provide expeditious
assistance in activating the vessel. Insufficient numbers of
shipyard personnel were available to provide for the needs of
the activation on an around the clock basis. For the first
three days of the activation full support and cooperation was
received from the shipyard, but it began to slip after that.
Limited support and supervision was provided after day four.
The shipyard personnel had limited experience with the foreign
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built vessel. This was especially noted in the area of
electrical equipment. [Ref. 21 :p. 2]
c. Coast Guard Inspectors
The MARAD representative noted that the USCG
inspectors were overly thorough with their inspection
requirements. This was evident from the quick look report
which stated that,
USCG inspectors insisted on inspecting every piece of
machinery, going thoroughly through automation tests;
picking on every detail and demanding to see every bit of
the test procedure and checking all spaces during the
activation period, regardless of the condition and status
of the vessel. [They had no] understanding that this is
a Ready Reserve Force Vessel and has been [in] lay-up
[since] only last year. [They were] not willing to make
any allowance for the new crew members or the officers.
A total of three full days (24 hour day) was devoted using
all manpower to accommodate the USCG deck and engine
inspectors. A day and a half was spent on the main engine
automation which did not prove anything for the vessel
except delaying the vessel from sailing and completing the
mission. Both inexperienced deck and engine inspectors
are detailing us to death without any consequence of the




Parts and material for the foreign built vessel were
not readily available in the United States to support repairs.
Time was lost while many parts were shipped from Europe.
[Ref. 21:p. 3]
6 Bunkering
The requirement to bunker the vessel during the
activation phase and prior to sea trials caused delays due to
taking key personnel away from other activation work. This
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also added to the fatigue of an already weary crew.
Additional delay was experienced when MSC had a problem
getting the fuel delivered in San Francisco on short notice.
[Ref. 21:p. 3]
7 . Summary
The activation of the CAPE HORN exceeded the five day
time limitation by about one and a third days. The Cape HORN
was activated on the East Coast and then transferred to the
West Coast for exercise Team Spirit '87, and was also
activated in 1989 for exercise Cobra Gold '89. Due to the
vessel's recent activation, the engineering plant was in good
condition. The major delay in activation was manning. The
full crew was not aboard until five days after the start of
the activation. The other problem was the fact that the crew
and shipyard personnel were not experienced with the foreign-
built engineering equipment.
H. ACTIVATION OF SS CAPE BRETON
The SS CAPE BRETON is a C4-S-66a design breakbulk type of
vessel with steam propulsion. It was built in 1967 and was
placed in the RRF in May of 1985. The CAPE BRETON was in good
condition when it was placed in the RRF. At the time of
breakout it was in the best overall condition of all breakbulk
vessels in the Western Region RRF. The CAPE BRETON was
activated in September of 1987 for exercise Kernel Blitz 87-2.
[Ref. 10]
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The CAPE BRETON was located at Pier 2, Hunters Point Naval
Shipyard, San Francisco, California at the time of activation
in a five day readiness status. Western Region Headquarters
of the Maritime Administration received notification to
activate the CAPE BRETON at 1308 PDT on August 19, 1990. The
ship manager for the CAPE BRETON is American President Lines
and the activation yard was Service Engineering Company, San
Francisco, California. The CAPE BRETON was activated at its
layberth. The CAPE BRETON was tendered to Military Sealift
Command at 1630 PDT on August 25. The total activation time
was five days, four hours and 52 minutes. The following





No significant problems in this area were encountered.
2 Engineering
Only minor problems were experienced in the
engineering department during the activation. These problems
included refractory repair in the starboard boiler, some
repairs to the engine room automation, and resetting the
overspeed trips on both of the Ship Service Turbine
Generators. [Ref. 22:p. 2]
3 Crtx
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
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4.
Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
The CAPE BRETON and the CAPE BORDA (section I below)
were activated alongside each other, simultaneously, by the
same contractor. During the activation some personnel and
equipment were used on both ships. This sharing of personnel
and equipment caused some delays in the activation of both
ships. Some of the key personnel had just completed the
activation of SS JUPITER and were fatigued from the outset.
This may have added to time required for activation. [Ref.
21:p. 2]
5 . Parts And Stores
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
€ . Bunkering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
7 . Summary
The CAPE BRETON was successfully activated within the
five day time limitation. The CAPE BRETON was in good
condition when it was placed in the RRF, and had been
activated in 1987 for exercise Kernel Blitz 87-2. There were
no major problems during the activation.
I. ACTIVATION OF SS CAPE BORDA
The SS CAPE BORDA is a C4-S-66a design breakbulk type of
vessel with steam propulsion. It was built in 1967 and was
placed in the RRF in April of 1985. The CAPE BORDA was in
good condition when it was placed in the RRF and at the time
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of breakout. The CAPE BORDA was activated in January of 1987
for exercise Team Spirit '87. [Ref. 10]
The CAPE BORDA was located at Hunters Point Naval
Shipyard, San Francisco, California at the time of activation
in a five day readiness status. Western Region Headquarters
of the Maritime Administration received notification to
activate the CAPE BORDA at 1308 PDT on August 20, 1990. The
ship manager for the CAPE BORDA is American President Lines
and the activation yard was Service Engineering Company, San
Francisco, California. The CAPE BORDA was activated at its
outport location simultaneously with the activation of the SS
CAPE BRETON. The CAPE BORDA was tendered to Military Sealift
Command at 1500 PDT on August 26. The total time for
activation was six days, one hour and 52 minutes. The
following problems were experienced during the activation of
the CAPE BORDA: [Ref. 23]
1 . Condition At Breakout
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
2 . Engineering
a. USCG Conditional Acceptance
MSC conditionally accepted the CAPE BORDA pending
repair and proper operation of the following equipment:
• Turbine driven lube oil pump.
• Vacuum leaks on number one and number 2 evaporators
.
• Governor on number two feed pump.
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• Port forced draft fan controller.
• Feed water regulator on starboard boiler.
• Engine room data-logger.
• Leaks on main throttle block strainer.
• Two soot-blower motors.
• Satisfying USCG's 835 reports on number two SSTG overspeed
trip, DC heater level indicator, shaft alley bilge alarm.
[Ref. 23:p. 2]
b. VmIvb Packing
Valve packing which had dried out during lay up was
a continuing problem. The packing material had dried out due
to the dehumidification process, and all deteriorated packing




No significant problems in this area were encountered.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
The activation of seven other RRF ships two weeks
prior had depleted the number of technical personnel. The
simultaneous activation of two vessels at the same pier also
stretched the shipyard personnel a little thin. This put an
even greater burden on a crew inexperienced with the steam
plant and break bulk function of the ship. They were required
to learn the ship and operate it at the same time. [Ref.
23:p. 2]
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5 . Parts And Stores
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
€ . Bunkering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
7 . Summary
The activation of the CAPE BORDA exceeded the five day
time limitation by a little over one day. The CAPE BORDA had
been activated for exercise Team Spirit ' 87 and had very few
problems at that time. The long lay-up period is most likely




This chapter discusses past activations of Ready Reserve
Force (RRF) ships in order to compare them with the West Coast
activation of RRF ships in support of Operation Desert Shield.
It first looks at the simultaneous breakout of the SS
PRESIDENT, SS CALIFORNIA, and USNS NORTHERN LIGHT (January
1985) on a ship-by-ship basis. Individual activations of the
SS CAPE BORDA (January 1987), SS CAPE BRETON (September 1987),
and MV CAPE HORN (April 1989) are then discussed. Comparisons
between the Operation Desert Shield activations discussed in
the previous chapter and the past activations discussed in
this chapter will occur in the following chapter.
The Chief of Naval Operations requested that COMSC
initiate the simultaneous activation of three West Coast
breakbulk ships on January 29, 1985. This was a no-notice
activation with two of the ships to be used in support of
exercise Team Spirit 85, and the third ship activated for test
purposes only. The activation commenced at 1317 PDT on
January 29, 1985 when MARAD was notified by MSC via telephone
to activate SS PRESIDENT, SS CALIFORNIA, and SS NORTHERN
LIGHT. All three of the vessels were in the RRF's five day
readiness category at the time of activation.
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A. ACTIVATION OF SS PRESIDENT
The SS PRESIDENT was broken out from Suisun Bay,
California, on January 30, 1985 and towed to Triple A
Shipyard, Hunters Point, San Francisco, California, for
activation. The PRESIDENT was, by far, in the worst material
condition of the three vessels at the outset of the breakout.
The initial sea trial held on 4-5 February 1985 was
unsuccessful and resulted in the PRESIDENT being adrift for
approximately six hours and returning to Triple A Shipyard
under flat tow. The second sea trial was successfully held on
8-9 April 1985. The president was tendered to MSCPAC on April
10, 1985 and was immediately retendered to MARAD. The
following is an overview of the material condition of the
PRESIDENT at the time of activation and major problems
encountered during the activation: [Ref. 24]
1 . Condition At Breakout
The initial impression of a MSC representative when he
boarded the SS PRESIDENT on January 30, 1985 was that "She was
far from being in satisfactory material condition
[Ref. 25:p. 2]." Specific problems encountered due to the
initial condition of the ship are discussed below.
a. Certificate Of Inspection
The vessel did not hold a current, valid
certificate of inspection (COI) due to USCG requirements to
replace boiler mounts and studs. A decision was made to hold
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the sea trial without replacing the boiler mounts and studs in
an attempt to get MSCPAC to accept the vessel conditional upon
the completion of the replacement. The COI was not expected
until four days after the planned completion of the initial
sea trial when the boiler mounts and studs were going to be
replaced. The vessel commenced sea trial without a COI. The
first MSCPAC report on the activation noted:
In light of the apparent condition of this vessel at the
time of breakout, the presentation within five days (is)
considered to have been forced and possibly unjustified.
Further, conduct of a sea trial without COI is
questionable. On subsequent breakouts, it is recommended
that sea trials not be undertaken without valid COI.
[Ref. 25:p. 4]
Jb. Firm Main And Ballast
There were numerous leaks in the fire main system
during pressure tests, and the cargo hold bilges could not
discharge ballast. The USCG inspectors required replacement
of approximately 300 feet of fire main before the sea trial
could commence. They also required that cargo hold bilge
pumps be capable of discharging ballast. [Ref. 25]
c. Le&king Boiler Tubes
Leaking floor tubes in the starboard boiler were a
major problem. Repairs to correct this problem were the
primary factor in delaying the initial sea trial by two days.
[Ref. 25]
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d. Other Initial Condition Problems
The following is a list of other major problems at
the time of breakout:
• Hull heavily encrusted and not in compliance with MSC
standards (keel to deep water line was sand blasted prior
to second sea trial)
.
• Hotel services such as showers, commodes and sinks
inoperable (corrected prior to second sea trial)
.
• Communications station did not conform to requirements
(corrected prior to first sea trial)
.
• Navigational equipment did not meet MSC requirements at
breakout (corrected prior to first sea trial)
.
• Material/operational condition of ship's gantry crane




2 . First Sea Trial
The first sea trail was unsuccessful due to major
engineering problems. At approximately 0400 on February 5,
1985 the starboard boiler had to be secured due to a ruptured
screen tube. The port boiler was secured at approximately
0700 due to water starvation. This left the vessel adrift
approximately eight miles off the California coast and 30
miles south of the San Francisco entrance for six hours. The
vessel had to be flat towed back to Triple A Shipyard. In
addition to the boiler problems, other minor problems such as
the ballasting of tanks were encountered. [Ref. 25]
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3 . Second Sea Trial
The second sea trial was successful and the vessel was
tendered to MSC on April 10 , 1985. The following problems
were encountered and corrected during the second sea trial:
• Port boiler retractable soot blower would not
automatically return to its original position.
• Forward feed pump overspeed trip malfunctioned requiring
manual operation.
• Selector switch between primary and back up lube oil feed
pumps malfunctioned causing governor to trip and temporary
loss of plant.
• Lube oil feed pumps ceased operating causing loss of plant
while testing emergency diesel for automatic starting.
[Ref. 26:pp. 3-4]
4 . Suitability For Military Contingencies
After successful completion of the second sea trial,
the PRESIDENT was tendered to MSC as a breakbulk, partially
configured for containers, non-self sustaining vessel. The
vessel's ability to meet military needs during a contingency
were questioned even though it had successfully completed the
sea trial.
Although the second sea trial was successful, the material
condition as regards metal surfaces of the container cells
was unsatisfactory and not [in accordance with] MSC
standards, being in significantly advanced stages of rust
encrustation and weather/age deterioration. Additionally
the condition of the removed container crane remained
questionable as well as the plan of action for its
replacement. Absence of this crane seriously degrades the
vessel utility as an RRF asset. As noted [Ref. 24], even
in a self sustaining configuration, the vessel is of
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marginal utility in view of cargoes encountered during
contingencies. [Ref 26 :p. 6]
5 . Recommendation
It was recommended that the SS PRESIDENT be removed
from the RRF due to its limited ability to meet the needs of
military contingencies [Ref 26:p. 6]. This problem was laid
out in greater detail concerning the sizes and configurations
of the vessel's cargo holds and cargo gear, and the
recommendation was made that the vessel be removed from the
RRF and placed in the NDRF [Ref. 27:pp. 2-3]. The final
decision was that the SS PRESIDENT was removed from the five
day readiness category of the RRF and placed in the 20-day
readiness category.
B. ACTIVATION OF SS CALIFORNIA
The activation of the SS CALIFORNIA was nearly the
opposite of that of the SS PRESIDENT (see section A above)
.
The CALIFORNIA was broken out from a berth at Naval Supply
Center, Oakland, California, on January 29, 1985 and towed to
the Service Engineering Facility, Pier 36, San Francisco,
California, for activation. The CALIFORNIA had been broken
out for exercise Bold Eagle 84 the previous September through
November so the General Agent and Service Engineering were
both very familiar with the vessel. At the time of the
breakout, the CALIFORNIA was being used as a training platform
for a cargo handling battalion at the Naval Supply Center.
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The vessel's recent service and use as a training platform led
to exceptional material condition at the time of activation.
The shipyard period of the activation process accounted for 66
hours of the five day breakout period. The sea trial was
successfully completed on February 2, 1985 and the vessel
tendered to MSC. The activation was completed within the five
day readiness criterion.
The CALIFORNIA performed without breakdown throughout Team
Spirit 85 and was turned over to MARAD on April 22, 1985 at
the completion of the exercise. The following is a discussion
of the few minor problems encountered during the activation:
[Ref. 28]
1 . Condition At Breakout
The vessel was in very good material condition at the
time of breakout and there were only a few minor problems, all
corrected prior to sea trial, that were encountered while
preparing for sea trial. These problems included:
• Gasket blew on first stage heater header (yard tightened
loose nuts)
.
• Cargo pump was removed to the shop for repairs.





2 . S«a Trial
The CALIFORNIA'S first sea trial was successful.
During the sea trial, held on the first and second of February
1985, MSC tests on the main engines, auxiliary equipment, and
steering engines were performed without any system failures
and the vessel was tendered to MSCPAC on February 2, 1985.
[Ref. 28:p. 2]
C. Activation Of SS NORTHERN LIGHT
The USNS NORTHERN LIGHT was broken out of the reserve
fleet, Suisun Bay, California, on January 30, 1985 and towed
to Todd Shipyard, San Francisco, California, for activation.
American President Lines was appointed general agent for the
NORTHERN LIGHT only a week prior to the breakout. The GA'
s
unfamiliarity with the vessel had an impact on the activation,
but the actual delay could not be quantified. The shipyard
period of the activation process accounted for 72 hours of
the five day breakout period. The time required to tow the
vessel to the shipyard and the 24 hour sea trial made up the
rest of the time. The sea trial was successfully completed on
February 2, 1985, but the vessel was not tendered to MSCPAC
until February 3, 1985 when cargo gear tests, not witnessed
prior to sea trial, were completed. The activation was
completed within the five day readiness criterion.
The NORTHERN LIGHT operated with exercise Team Spirit 85
and was turned over to MARAD on April 16, 1985 at the
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completion of the exercise. The following is a discussion of
the problems encountered during the activation: [Ref. 30]
1 . Condition At Breakout
a. Blank Removal And Opening Doors
The greatest problem encountered during activation
was the removal of blanks from the underside of the hull and
the opening of sealed doors into the midship house. Although
the removal of the blanks and opening of the doors was
accomplished, it was made very difficult due to silicon
sealant acting as an adhesive. [Ref. 30 :p. 2]
b . Engineering
No problems in the engineering plant were
encountered that caused delay in the activation. All minor
engineering problems were repaired prior to sea trial.
2 . Sea Trial
The sea trial was held on February 2 through 3, 1985.
Successful MSC tests on the main engines, auxiliary equipment,
and steering engine were accomplished with no engineering
failures
.
The only problem encountered during the sea trial was
difficulty starting the lifeboat engine. This problem was not
solved prior to completion of the sea trial. The certificate
of inspection (COI) was not issued until this problem was
resolved, and MSCPAC acceptance of the vessel was conditional
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on repairs. On February 4, 1985 the problem was resolved and
the COI was issued. [Ref. 31 :p. 2]
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM ABOVE SIMULTANEOUS ACTIVATIONS
1
.
Periodic Steaming Of RRF Ships
The Commander, Military Sealift Command, Pacific made
a recommendation aimed at solving the problem of RRF ships
that did not have current COI's. This recommendation would
involve periodic steaming of RRF ships in the five day
readiness category to allow early identification of problems
that would prevent activation within prescribed time limits.
A program which would allow MARAD to maintain RRF 5
category vessels in class, e.g., interim periodic steaming
of vessels (every six to 12 months) to facilitate early
identification of problems which might invalidate the COI
and allow repair (s) as required to retain in class and
maintain the currency of the COI. [Ref. 27 :p. 1]
The response to this recommendation was that although
it was a valid recommendation, it would be cost prohibitive to
implement such a program. The following alternative
recommendation to solve the same problem was made by
Commander, Military Sealift Command:
Improved preventive maintenance programs implemented by
MARAD, more stringent requirements for ships entering the
RRF, and acquisition of newer, more reliable ships should
help to alleviate problems of this nature. [Ref. 24 :p. 1]
2 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
The following observation was made by Commander,
Military Sealift Command, Pacific, regarding the shipyard
workforce available for simultaneous breakout of RRF ships at
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the completion of the breakout of SS PRESIDENT, SS CALIFORNIA
and USNS NORTHERN LIGHT:
The . . . breakout involved three ships being activated
simultaneously. It was obvious at the outset that both
government and commercial resources were insufficient to
staff around the clock with requisite personnel . Many
personnel worked over forty eight hours with but minimum
rest. Efficiency and safe working practices diminished as
the effort continued, in order to meet the five day
criteria. Work on other ships, commercial and military
charter, were impacted as resources assigned to those
vessels were needed and diverted to meet the requirements
of [all three vessels] . This included regulatory
representatives such as USCG inspectors. It is apparent
that simultaneous breakout of a larger number of ships
will overwhelm local shipyard, regulatory, and GA
resources. [Ref. 32 :p. 2]
E. ACTIVATION OF SS CAPE BORDA
The SS CAPE BORDA is a C4-S-66a class breakbulk vessel
with steam propulsion. It was located at Pier 38, San
Francisco, California in a five day readiness status when it
was activated for exercise Team Spirit '87. Western Region
Headquarters of the Maritime Administration received
notification to activate the CAPE BORDA at 1100 PDT on January
26, 1987. The general agent for the CAPE BORDA was American
President Lines and the activation yard was Service
Engineering Company, San Francisco, California. The CAPE
BORDA was towed from its layberth to the shipyard for
activation. The CAPE BORDA was tendered to Military Sealift
Command at 0554 PDT January 31, 1987. The total time for
activation was four days, 18 hours and 54 minutes. The
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following problems were experienced during the activation of
the CAPE BORDA: [Ref. 33]
1 . Condition At Breakout
The CAPE BORDA was in good condition when it was
acquired for the RRF. There were no major problems due to the
vessel's condition at breakout. The quick look report had no
major engineering problems which caused delay in activation to
report. [Ref. 33]
2 . Engineering




No significant problems in this area were encountered.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
Concerning the amount of personnel the shipyard had
working on the vessel, the quick look report noted:
Start up requires lots of mechanics and boilermakers
crafts for maximum effort. Shipyards do not seem to grasp
emergency situation requirements. [Ref. 33 :p. 2]
5 Parts And Stores
The quick look report noted that a programming system
needed to be developed for spare parts at hand. This
indicates that when the crew arrived they were not sure what
spare parts were available aboard. [Ref. 33]
6 . Bunkering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
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7 . Summary
The activation of the SS CAPE BORDA was successfully
completed within the five day time limit. Even though the
activation was a success, the quick look report noted:
A hectic time to retest men and material [within the time
limits of] the five-day activation. . .pushes men to
exhaustion which is really not necessary and is, in our
opinion, dangerous. We recommend, again, a return to the
[five to ten] day activation in order to bring some sense
to our efforts. [Ref. 33 :p. 2]
F. ACTIVATION OF SS CAPE BRETON
The SS CAPE BRETON is a C4-S-66a class breakbulk vessel
with steam propulsion. It was located at North Pier, Hunters
Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, California in a five day
readiness status when it was activated for exercise Kernel
Blitz 87-2. Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime
Administration received notification to activate the CAPE
BRETON at 1445 PDT on September 9, 1987. The general agent
for the CAPE BRETON was American President Lines and the
activation yard was Service Engineering Company, San
Francisco, California. The CAPE BRETON was activated at its
layberth. The CAPE BRETON was tendered to Military Sealift
Command at 915 PDT on September 14, 1987. The total
activation time was four days, 18 hours and 30 minutes. The
following problems were experienced during the activation of




The CAPE BRETON was in good condition when it was
acquired for the RRF . Preventive maintenance performed during




The removal of the hull blanks took much longer
than normal. This was caused by difficult tidal currents at
the activation berth. Divers had to fight these currents
while removing the hull blanks. [Ref. 34]
b. Throttlm Valvm Governor
A problem with the vessel's throttle valve governor
limited speed to 67 RPM during the sea trial. This problem
could only be corrected after the sea trial and resulted in a
conditional acceptance by MSCPAC. The problem was corrected
and a full power run was conducted on the first voyage leg.
This satisfied MSCPAC s requirements.
3 Crew
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
The quick look report noted that the activation was
"... very beneficial to [the] General Agent and two MARAD
Marine Surveyors who learned more about activation of this




No significant problems in this area were encountered.
6 . Bunkering
No significant problems in this area were encountered.
7 . Summary
The activation of the CAPE BRETON was successfully
completed within the five day time limitation. Even though
removal of the hull blanks took much longer than normal, the
activation of the major engineering systems was accomplished
quickly without much hinderance.
G. ACTIVATION OF MV CAPE HORN
The MV CAPE HORN is a class G-2 RO/RO motorship. It was
located at Pier 2, Hunters Point, San Francisco, California in
a five day readiness status when it was activated for exercise
Cobra Gold '89. Western Region Headquarters of the Maritime
Administration received notification to activate the CAPE HORN
at 0505 PDT on April 17, 1989. The ship manager for the CAPE
HORN was Interocean Management Corporation and the activation
yard was J & H Marine, San Francisco, California. The CAPE
HORN was activated at the layberth. The CAPE HORN was
tendered to Military Sealift Command at 1400 PDT on April 25,
1989. The total activation time was eight days, eight hours
and 55 minutes. The following problems were experienced




Contaminated fuel was discovered at the time of
breakout. This problem is further discussed in section (2.)
below.
2 . Engineering
The only major engineering problems were contaminated
fuel oil tanks for the ship service generators and salt water
contamination of the main engine lube oil sump. These
problems caused delays while the contaminated fuel oil and




The full crew was aboard the vessel three days after
the breakout began. The crew had little experience with the
foreign built vessel and had to learn as they went along.
4 . Workforce Resources Available For Breakout
a. Ship Manager
There was a problem with the ship manager not being
familiar with the vessel or the contract. As the quick look
report noted:
The ship manager was not intimately familiar with the
ship or the requirements of the ship manager contract.
The activation was managed solely by one full-time port
engineer on-site with the assistance of a consultant. As
a result, planning and scheduling suffered and fatigue
affected performance. [Ref. 35 :p. 1]
Jb Skilled Technicians
Skilled technicians with the experience necessary
to work on important equipment were not available on short
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notice. The technicians that were available were not familiar
with the foreign built equipment and were unable to activate
the vessel expeditiously. [Ref. 35 :p. 2]
c. Shipyard Personnel
The shipyard was not completely prepared for the
activation. The quick look report noted: "The activation
ship repair facility has limited experience and personnel to




No significant problems in this area were encountered.
6 . Bunkering
Delay in the activation process was caused by MSC's
requirement that the vessel be bunkered full prior to sea
trial. Delivery of the required fuels on short notice was a
problem. Bunkering during the activation process took key
personnel away from other activation work and added to the
fatigue factor. [Ref. 35 :p. 2]
7 . Summary
The activation of the CAPE HORN was not completed
within the five day time limitation. Even though delays were
caused by inexperienced personnel from both the shipyard and
the crew, the quick look report noted that it might have been
possible for the activation to be completed on schedule if not
for the unexpected engineering problems. [Ref. 35]
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will analyze the information previously
presented and provide recommendations concerning prevention of
problems encountered during activation of RRF vessels. The
information in this chapter is divided into the same major
categories as were used in Chapter III, condition at breakout,
engineering, crew, etc. In each of these sections an overview
of the problems encountered for that category is first
presented, followed by a comparison of past and present
activations and finally recommendations.
A. CONDITION AT BREAKOUT
1 . Overview of Problems
It is no surprise that the better the condition of the
vessel at the time of breakout, the easier it is to activate.
The longer a vessel is in lay-up, the more its condition
deteriorates and the longer it takes to activate it. In many
cases, the initial condition of the vessels activated was not
adequate to support activation within the required five day
time limitation. If a vessel is in unsatisfactory material
condition at the time of breakout, it is unlikely that it can
be activated in five days even if a full crew is aboard at the
time of breakout. A recurring problem was the unexpected
deteriorated condition of gaskets and valve packing material
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in the engineering spaces. This most likely was a result of
the dehumidification process used to prevent corrosion during
the lay-up period. In some cases a problem dating back to the
last time a vessel was in service caused much delay to
correct
.
2 . Comparison Of Past And Current Activations
Although some of the RRF vessels activated for
Operation Desert Shield were in relatively poor condition,
none were nearly as bad as the PRESIDENT when it was activated
in January of 1985. The survey and inspection procedures in
Phase IV appear to be able to keep vessels from becoming as
deteriorated as the PRESIDENT was. The past activation of the
CALIFORNIA showed that relatively few problems occur when
activating a vessel that had just recently been operated for
an exercise and was in good material condition. The
activations of CAPE HORN, CAPE BORDA and CAPE BRETON were
similar to the case of the CALIFORNIA in that they had all
been activated for exercises within a year or two of the
Operation Desert Shield activation and were in good condition.
The PRESIDENT was not only in very poor material
condition when it was broken out, it also did not have a
current COI . The present procedures for ensuring that each
vessel maintains a current COI appear to be working as none of
the Operation Desert Shield vessels had this problem.
77
3 . Recommendations
The best way to keep the material condition of RRF
vessels in sufficient state of readiness to meet five day
activation times is to exercise them as often as possible and
lay them up properly at the end of the exercise period. It is
much easier to activate a ship that has recently been laid up
after an exercise period than one that has been in lay-up for
as long as five years. Exercising RRF vessels often will also
keep crews trained in the operation of older or foreign-built
machinery. Unfortunately, frequent activation of RRF vessels
is cost prohibitive. Considering the current budget
constraints, it is questionable whether MARAD will be able to
meet its goal of activating each RRF vessel at least once
every five years. It is therefore imperative that all of the
vessels activated in support of Operation Desert Shield be
properly laid-up when being deactivated at the completion of
their operations.
Dried out gaskets and valve packing material in the
engineering spaces was a major problem during the activations.
The procedure for dehumidifying the engineering spaces should
be reviewed to see if another method of lay-up might provide
equal protection without damaging gaskets and packing
material. If a method of laying up boilers could be found
that does not require draining the boilers, this would be
ideal. It would allow maintenance crews to periodically light
off the plant and operate machinery without the tremendous
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cost of lighting off and then laying-up a boiler that has been
drained and dehumidified.
The ex-USNS vessels appear to have been in poorer
condition when placed in the RRF than the other vessels . It
might be helpful to allow MARAD to supervise the deactivation
of USNS vessels rather than having MSC deactivate them and
turn them over to MARAD on an as-is basis.
The condition of each vessel at the time of
deactivation should be carefully documented by the crew that
last operated it, and this information should be retained for
reference by the next crew to man it. Special note should be
made of any measures taken to keep marginal machinery
operational as this will give the next crew a good idea of
where to start trouble shooting when similar problems arise.
B . ENGINEERING
1 . Overview Of Problems
At the outset of the breakout the major common problem
was dried out gaskets and packing material. In some cases,
most of the material had to be removed and replaced. This
problem had to do with the initial condition of the vessels at
the time of breakout, and was discussed above.
Engineering problems often occur unexpectedly and are
very time consuming to repair. The CAPE DUCATO is an example
of this. Since it has a diesel propulsion plant, the vessel
had a maintenance crew that periodically operated the main
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engines during the lay-up period. Although no problems were
noticed during test operation, major problems with the fuel
delivery system were discovered when the engines were placed
under a load. These problems caused major delays in the
activation process. Boiler casualties are also very time
consuming to repair.
2 . Comparison Of Past And Current Activations
Major engineering problems can cause a vessel to
exceed the five day limit by a considerable amount of time.
This was true of the PRESIDENT in 1985 when boiler casualties
contributed to a 71 day activation time. This is similar to
the activations in support of Operation Desert Shield where
boiler problems contributed to a 14-day activation on the
COMET r and fuel delivery problems for the main diesel engines
contributed to a 14-day activation on the CAPE DUCATO.
3 . Recommendations
The better the condition an engineering plant is in,
the less likely unexpected problems will occur. Proper
maintenance during the lay-up period can help prevent major
engineering problems when the vessel is activated.
The only solution to problems that cannot be found
during maintenance operations is to have crews that are
knowledgeable and have experience with that particular
engineering plant. These experienced engineers usually will
be able to expeditiously remedy the problem.
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C. CREW
1 . Overview Of Problems
The main problems with the crews for the vessels
activated are that they either arrive late in the activation
process or are inexperienced with the vessels' equipment and
machinery. The problem of inexperience with the equipment and
machinery is especially important in the case of foreign-built
diesel vessels. These problems often cause the activation to
exceed the five day limit.
The Chief Engineer and a third mate were on the
maintenance team of CAPE DUCATO for a year before it was
activated for Operation Desert Shield. They had a lot of
knowledge of the foreign diesel plant at the time of
activation. This was very helpful at first, but unfortunately
it was not helpful when the vessel developed problems under a
full load.
2 . Comparison Of Past And Current Activations
The past activations studied do not mention any crew
problems except for the 1989 activation of CAPE HORN. During
that activation the same problems of the crew reporting late





The engineers who will man the RRF vessels must get
experience operating these older or foreign-built vessels.
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This can be done on the diesel vessels by having them work on
the maintenance teams during lay-up. The ship managers should
also have engineers train on the foreign-built vessels during
lay-up to give them needed experience.




The diminishing United States shipbuilding industry
has led to a decline in the workforce resources available to
work on RRF vessels when they are activated. This problem is
compounded when several vessels are activated simultaneously
as they were in support of Operation Desert Shield. Also very
few resources are available that have any experience at all
working on the foreign-built diesel vessels.
2 . Comparison Of Past And Current Activations
During the simultaneous activation of the PRESIDENT,
CALIFORNIA and NORTHERN LIGHT in 1985 it was noted that there




The foreign diesels should be activated whenever
feasible to familiarize shipyard personnel with the foreign-
built equipment and machinery. The ship managers should also
be required to train resources on these foreign vessels so








At the time of breakout the vessel is required to have
enough spare parts and supplies aboard to support operations
for 180 days. MSCPAC inspectors noted that in many cases
supplies and parts were extremely short of the required amount
[Ref . 16] . In some cases when the vessel is broken out there
is no inventory so the crew does not know what parts are
available or where they are located. Spare parts are often
used during the activation phase and are not replaced before
the vessel leaves for its voyage. Some parts and materials
for the foreign vessels were not available in the United
States and had to be shipped from Europe.
2 . Comparison Of Past And Current Activations
The only mention of parts and stores in the past
activation reports was from the CAPE BORDA. This report
stated that a programming system needed to be developed for
spare parts at hand.
3 . Recommendations
An inventory of spare parts and supplies should be
taken well in advance of a vessel being activated. This
inventory should be conducted when the vessel is placed in
lay-up so that parts can be obtained and placed aboard in
order to be ready for activation. When it becomes necessary
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to use on-board spares during the activation phase, they





During the RRF activations in support of Operation
Desert Shield, MSCPAC required that the vessels be bunkered
full prior to sea trials. This requirement takes crew members
away from other activation jobs and adds to the fatigue factor
in the activation. MARAD representatives stated that in the
past a verbal agreement between MARAD and MSCPAC had required
only that the vessel carry sufficient bunkers to complete sea
trial [Ref . 17]
.
2 . Comparison Of Past And Current Activations
The requirement to bunker the vessel full prior to sea
trial was not mentioned in the past activations studied until
the activation of CAPE HORN in 1989. The CAPE HORN activation
mentioned the same problems of the crew being taken away from
other activation jobs and adding to the fatigue factor.
3 . Recommendations
Bunkering full prior to sea trial appears to interrupt
the activation activities and add another burden to an already
weary crew. The possibility of bunkering when the vessel is
loaded out prior to voyage should be considered whenever





It would be beneficial if representatives from all of the
parties involved in the activation of each vessel were to get
together and discuss the problems encountered during the
activation. This meeting should take place as soon after the
activation is completed as possible so that it is fresh in
everyone's mind. This meeting would be beneficial in avoiding
similar problems in the future, especially if the information
is documented and widely disseminated.
85















A.B.S. Identification Number: The first two digits
represent the year the vessel was built.
Annual Bull Survey: To be made within 3 months
either way of each anniversary date of the
crediting of the previous Special Survey of
Bull or original construction date.
Annual Machinery Survey: To be made within 3 months
either way of each anniversary date of the
crediting of the previous Special Survey of
Machinery or original construction date.
Annual Load Line Inspection: Complete within time
frame of three (3) months before or after the
load line anniversary date.
Intermediate Survey: Complete approximately two and
one half (2k) years alter each Special Survey
Special Annual Survey: To be made within 3 months
either way of each anniversary date of the
crediting of the previous Special Survey of
Machinery or original construction date.
Drudcck Survey: Out of water inspection maxinum
ten (10) years under certain' conditions as
per Agreement.
Pert and Starboard Watertuhe Boiler Survey:
Complete on or about due date











Two £ oze half
(2k) Years
(see note)







YGS Year of Grace Surveu
Special Survey
Taken from -Ref . 8)
Complete by due date of the
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SSE Special Periodical Survey Bull: Complete within four
(4) years alter crediting date of previous Special
Periodical Survey Bull.
NOTE: If the Tear of Grace Survey is satisfactorily
coapleted about the time that the SSE is due the
completion of the Special Survey Bull uy be Svery four (4)
deferred for a period not exceeding twelve (12) Years (see
months, providing the whole Special Survey is note)
satisfactorily coapleted within five (5) years
from the crediting date of the previous
Special Survey Bull.
SSM Special Periodical Survey Machinery
:
Complete within
four (4) years after crediting date of previous Bvery four (4)
Special Periodical Survey Machinery . NOTB: The Years (see
•tfote* under SSE applies.- note)
CMS \ Continous Machinery Survey: Complete Special Survey Five (5) Y<ear:
Machinery within five (5) year span. RRF vessels span
on Continuous Machinery Survey must complete
all due items before or at reactivation.
iternational International Load Line Certificate
:
Complete survey
>ad Line by due date. Vessels under twenty (20) years old
>rzificate are issued five (5) year Load Line Certificates
.
Five (5) /"tear
Vessels over twenty (20) years old are issued
four (4) year certificates . After a Special
Periodical Survey is completed a five (5) months
provisional load line certificate is issued pend-
ing issuance of full term certificate by ABS/EQ.
RRF vessels that are en Special Annual Survey
Status are issued International Load Line Certi-
ficates valid for one (1) year.
TS Tailshaft Survey - Continuous Liner/Water Lubricated
Bearings: Tailshafts fitted with continuous liners Three (3) Vear
to be drawn at least ence every three (3) years single screw
for single-screw vessels and four (4) years for
multi-screw vesels. Cn single-screw vessels Four (4) Year
with tailshafts having continuous liners the multi-sere*
examination may be extended to five (5) years
when requested by Cvner provided certain
conditions noted in Rules arc met.
Oil-Lubricated Bearings: Tailshafts with effectively
sealed oil-lubricated bearings may be drawn on Five (5) Y ear
five (5) year survey intervals provided conditions




noted in Rules are aet. A further extension of
one (1) year ray be considered whan requested by
Owner provided conditions noted in Rules Are met.
NOTS: In the case of RRP vessels whose tsllshAfts were
drawn and surveyed during deactivation or in lay-up
and found or made satisfactory and are specially
prepared for lay-up in accordance with HARJLD's
established procedures the Tailshaft Survey Interval
will be ten (10) years. For other shafts not
eligible for ten (10) year survey intervals , the
the propeller shaft survey due date may be
deferred up to the next due Drydocklng in
consideration of the lack of use. This assumes
that the stern bearing clearance is satisfactory
and the externally visible part of the stern
bearing assembly is found' in order by a diver
during the reactivation inspection.
Caugings must be taken at zaxlmum of five (5) year
intervals for the due Special Periodical Survey
and as otherwise required by ABS Surveyor.
Safetu Construction Certificate: Issued upon
completion of the Special Surveys of Bull and
Machinery for a period of five (5) years (the
due date of the next Special Surveys plus the
Year of Grace). On vessels where the due daes of
the Special Surveys of Bull and Machinery do not
coincide
,
the SLC is issued to the due date of
the earlier Special Survey.
RRF vessels that are on Special Annual Survey Status
are issued Safety Construction Certificates








Mandatory Annual Survey for Safety Construction
to be made within 3 ocnths either way of each
anniversary date of the crediting of the previous
Special Survey of Bull or original construction date.
Annual Cargo Gear Survey: Complete by due date.
Quadrennial Cargo Gear Surrey: Complete by due date
or at time of reactivation.
Annual





APPENDIX B: USCG INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
Unless the system/element is modified below, the inspection interval shall be as
prescribed in the appropriate USCG regulations.
INSPECTION INTERVALS FOR RRF VESSELS
Applicable
Inspection USCG Rule *
Boiler Hydrostatic Test 61.05-10
Nomal Modified
Internal Inspection Interval
4 years At 4 year intervals but may be
extended to Phase V break-out.
Boiler Safety Valve Test 61.05-20(a) 2 years At each inspection for
certification but may be
extended to Phase V break-out.
Boiler Valve Examination 61.05-15(a) 4 years
Remove and Examine Boiler 61.05-15(b), 8 years







During Phase II open and exam
boiler valves; thence at
4 year intervals but may be
extended to Phase V lay-up.**
During Phase II, examine
mounting and replace studs;
thence at 8 year intervals
but may be extended to Phase V
lay-up.**
Prior to placing in service
but not less than 2 years after
it was last examined/hydroed.
At each inspection for
certification but may be
extended to Phase V break-out.
Steam Piping Hydro 61.15-5(a),(b) 4 years At 4 year intervals but may be
extended to Phase V break-out.
Steam Piping Safeties
Test
61.15-5(c) 2 years At each inspection for
certification but may be
extended to Phase V break-out.
CO2 Bulk Storage Tanks
Hydrostatic Test
iken from Ref. 7)
61.10-5(g) 8 years At 8 year . intervals but may be








12. Portable CO2 Extinguisher
Cylinder Test
13. Fixed C0 2 Extinguisher
Hydro
14. Cargo Gear Examination
(Visual)
15. Cargo Gear Dismantling
and Proof Load Testing
_6. Cargo Ship Safety
Equipment Certificate
17. Cargo Ship Safety
Construction Certificate




























20. Ring Bouy Self -activating 33.40-5(c)
Smoke Signal 94.43-10(c)
21 Red Flare and Orange
Smoke Distress Signals


















Approved and serviced equipmerS
to be provided during Phase V/||
As in item 10 above.
As required by USCG rule
During Phase II; thence at
12 year intervals but may be
extended to Phase V lay-up**
Prior to operation of gear but
not less than 1 year after pri
examination.
During Phase II; thence at
4 year intervals but may be
extended to Phase V lay-up**
As required by USCG rule.
As required by USCG rule
As required by FCC
As required by MARP0L 73/78.
If maintained on board, as
required. Otherwise, up-to-da
equipment to be provided in
Phase V break-out.




















2.5 years As required by USCG rule
5 years At 5 year intervals, but cay
be extended to Phase V lay-up**
5 years At 5 or 10 year
(for fresh intervals (see note)
water)
5 years At 5 or 10 year
(for fresh intervals (see note)
water)
Note: 1. All vessels are required to be drydocked after 3 years
accumulated activation tine (phase V breakout plus phase time).
2. Ten year interval : If properly prepared as described in
Annex II, and provided activation time does not exceed three
years in 10, a vessel will be drydocked at 10 year intervals
minius activation time. Vessels in the 10 year program must
satisfactory complete an underwater survey at year 5 as described
in Annex II.
3. Five vqar interval : If a vessel is not properly prepared, as
in 2 above, it will be drydocked at a 5 year interval
Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations unless otherwise noted,
** Tests and/or inspections which are extended to Phase V lay-up
shall be completed not later than six months after vessel enters
Phase if operation phase is six months or longer.
aken from Ref. 7)
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APPENDIX C: RRF ACTIVATION HISTORY
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